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Is theism a simple hypothesis? The simplicity of omni-properties
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 January 2015
Abstract
One reason for thinking that theism is a relatively simple theory – and that it is thereby more likely to be true than other theories, ceteris paribus – is to insist that infinite degrees of properties are simpler than extremely large, finite degrees of properties. This defence of theism has been championed by Richard Swinburne in recent years. I outline the objections to this line of argument present in the literature, and suggest some novel resources open to Swinburne in defence. I then argue that scientists' preference for universal nomological propositions constitutes a very strong reason for supposing that theism is simpler than parodical alternatives in virtue of its positing omni-properties rather than parallel ‘mega-properties’.
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