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The inclusion model of the Incarnation: problems and prospects

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 June 2001

TIM BAYNE
TIM BAYNE
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, University of Canterbury, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch, New Zealand
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Abstract

Thomas Morris and Richard Swinburne have recently defended what they call the ‘two-minds’ model of the Incarnation. This model, which I refer to as the ‘inclusion model’ or ‘inclusionism’, claims that Christ had two consciousnesses, a human and a divine consciousness, with the former consciousness contained within the latter one. I begin by exploring the motivation for, and structure of, inclusionism. I then develop a variety of objections to it: some philosophical, others theological in nature. Finally, I sketch a variant of inclusionism which I call ‘restricted inclusionism’ (RI); RI can evade many, but not all, of the objections to standard inclusionism.

Type
Research Article
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 37 , Issue 2 , June 2001 , pp. 125 - 141
Copyright
© 2001 Cambridge University Press

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