Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-mkpzs Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-25T05:41:21.491Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The grounding objection to middle knowledge revisited

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 April 2003

STEVEN B. COWAN
STEVEN B. COWAN
Affiliation:
Apologetics Resource Center, 130 Inverness Plaza, #166, Birmingham, AL 35242
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

The Molinist doctrine that God has middle knowledge requires that God knows the truth-values of counterfactuals of freedom, propositions about what free agents would do in hypothetical circumstances. A well-known objection to middle knowledge, the grounding objection, contends that counterfactuals of freedom have no truth-value because there is no fact to the matter as to what an agent with libertarian freedom would do in counterfactual circumstances. Molinists, however, have offered responses to the grounding objection that they believe are adequate for maintaining the coherence of middle knowledge. I argue that these responses to the grounding objection are not adequate, and that what I call the ‘generic grounding objection’ still poses a serious challenge to middle knowledge.

Type
Research Article
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 39 , Issue 1 , March 2003 , pp. 93 - 102
Copyright
© 2003 Cambridge University Press

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)