Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 October 2008
The issue of free will versus fate can be analysed in three ways in relation to the Bhagavadgīā,: (1) by focusing on those verses of the Gita which address themselves to this question; (2) by focusing on the figure of Arjuna himself who, as will be shown, crystallizes around his person the issue of free will and fate; and (3) by focusing on the Kauravas who are similarly involved in the issue.
page 531 note 1 Douglas, W., Hill, P., The Bhagavadgītā (Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 204–5.Google Scholar
page 531 note 2 Edgerton, Franklin, The Bhagavadgitā (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), p. 102.Google Scholar
page 531 note 3 Ibid. p. 84.
page 531 note 4 Ibid.
page 532 note 1 Ibid. p. 90.
page 532 note 2 Ibid. p. 91.
page 532 note 3 Ibid. p. 89.
page 533 note 1 Also see Bhagavadgitā III. 33 for an anticipation of this argument.
page 533 note 2 If the distinction drawn above between the two kinds of determinisms is obliterated, then the teaching of the Gitā is reduced to a kind of ontological determinism in which everything is the will of God. This position approximates the Islamic doctrine of jabr in the most severe form, and even in Islam some kind of a theoretical or practical via media had to be adopted (see Zaehner, R. C., ed., The Concise Encyclopedia of Living Faiths [Boston: Beacon Press, 1959], p. 200).Google Scholar
page 534 note 1 In the contexts the words ahankāra and buddhi do not seem to possess the technical Sānkhyan connotations.
page 534 note 2 Unfortunately the sequence in which these verses appear does not help in resolving the issue because of the simultaneous presence in the Hindu lore of traditions according priority to the former, as well as the latter. Thus the Mīmāmsā doctrine of pūrvapūrvabalīyastvam accords priority to earlier statements while the grammatical doctrine of uttarottarabalīyastvam to the latter. 1 am indebted for this clarification to Miss Alaka Hejib of McGill University.
page 534 note 3 One is reminded here of the following Marxian paradox: ‘Why then, if the decay and collapse of capitalism are inevitable, should it be necessary to form organizations and discipline cadres to hasten its downfall? What purpose would be served by revolutionary agitation if the historical outcome would be no different? Orthodox Marxists have normally hedged this question, arguing that militant organization acts as a midwife to hasten social change. The rejoinder, however, fails to dispose of the methodological problem’ ( Barber, William J., A History of Economic Thought [Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1967] p. 162).Google Scholar
page 535 note 1 Edgerton, Franklin, op. cit. pp. 57–8.Google Scholar
page 535 note 2 Ibid. p. 58.
page 535 note 3 Bhagavadgītā XVI. 6.Google Scholar
page 535 note 4 Edgerton, Frankling, op. cit. p. 78.Google Scholar
page 535 note 5 Ibid. p. 76.
page 536 note 1 The use of the word karma in Bhagavadgītā XVIII. 60 could be misleading in this context. Note that the word karmanā has to be construed with the adjective svabhavajena and not with some hypo-thetical or parenthetical pūrvajanmanā.
page 536 note 2 Mahadevan, T. M. P., Outlines of Hinduism (Bombay: Chetana Ltd, 1960), pp. 6o–1.Google Scholar
page 536 note 3 Johnson, Raynor C., The Imprisoned Splendour (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1953), p. 173.Google Scholar
page 536 note 4 Ibid.
page 536 note 5 Ibid. p. 174.
page 537 note 1 Bhagavadgītā IV. 5 and xv. 8 seem to imply this general belief in the doctrine of Karma. Also see Radhakrishnan, S., The Bhagavadgītā (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1960), p. 356.Google Scholar