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The epistemic benefits of religious disagreement

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 February 2019

KATHERINE DORMANDY Open the ORCID record for KATHERINE DORMANDY [Opens in a new window]
KATHERINE DORMANDY*
Affiliation:
Department of Christian Philosophy, Karl-Rahner Platz 1, 6020Innsbruck, Austria
*
e-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

Scientific researchers welcome disagreement as a way of furthering epistemic aims. Religious communities, by contrast, tend to regard it as a potential threat to their beliefs. But I argue that religious disagreement can help achieve religious epistemic aims. I do not argue this by comparing science and religion, however. For scientific hypotheses are ideally held with a scholarly neutrality, and my aim is to persuade those who are committed to religious beliefs that religious disagreement can be epistemically beneficial for them too.

Type
Original Article
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 56 , Issue 3 , September 2020 , pp. 390 - 408
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019

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