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Egoism or the problem of evil: a dilemma for sceptical theism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 August 2012

BENJAMIN T. RANCOURT
BENJAMIN T. RANCOURT*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Massachusetts – Amherst, Amherst, MA 01003-9269, USA e-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

Sceptical theists undermine the argument from evil by claiming that our ability to distinguish between justified and unjustified evil is weak enough that we must take seriously the possibility that all evil is justified. However, I argue that this claim leads to a dilemma: either our judgements regarding unjustified evil are reliable enough that the problem of evil remains a problem, or our judgements regarding unjustified evil are so unreliable that it would be misguided to use them in our decision-making. The first horn undermines theism, while the second undermines our moral decision-making. Thus, sceptical theism is problematic.

Type
Articles
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 49 , Issue 3 , September 2013 , pp. 313 - 325
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012 

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