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Does divine hiding undermine Positive Evidential Atheism?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 March 2015

SCOTT F. AIKIN
SCOTT F. AIKIN*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN 37240, USA e-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

Positive Evidential Atheism is the two-part view that our available evidence sufficiently supports the belief that God does not exist and that God's non-existence is a morally good thing. Paul Moser's recent work (2012, 2013, 2014, and forthcoming) provides a case that Positive Evidential Atheism is undermined by ‘intentional divine elusiveness’. This essay defends Positive Evidential Atheism from Moser's objection along two lines: (1) Moser's undercutting argument does not respect the fact that the positivity and evidentiality claims of Positive Evidential Atheism are logically connected, and (2) positive atheists needn't be those from whom God has hidden.

Type
Articles
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 52 , Issue 2 , June 2016 , pp. 205 - 212
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2015 

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