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Theist concept-nominalism and the regress problem

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 July 2018

TIEN-CHUN LO
TIEN-CHUN LO*
Affiliation:
Faculty of Theology and Religion, University of Oxford, OX2 6GG, UK
*
e-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

Leftow's theist concept-nominalism is proposed as a theory of properties which is compatible with God's aseity and sovereignty. In this article, I focus on the question of whether theist concept-nominalism is successful in answering a notorious problem in the literature on properties, i.e. the regress problem. In the second section, I summarize TCN by illustrating what its ontology is and how its theory works. In the third section, the regress problem is recast within the framework of TCN. In the fourth section, I present my solution to this problem. In the final section, several objections to my solution are addressed and replied.

Type
Articles from the 2018 Postgraduate Essay Prize
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 55 , Issue 2 , June 2019 , pp. 199 - 213
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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