Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 October 2008
It might appear to be beyond question, for Christian theism, both that God is omniscient and that omniscience includes knowledge of future truth. For it seems obvious that if P is true, then an omniscient being knows that P. P, in this propositional function, is entirely general, and must therefore include propositions of the form: ‘it will be the case that X’. If, truly, it will be the case that X, then God knows that truth.
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