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Some moral critique of theodicy is misplaced, but not all

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 April 2009

ROBERT SIMPSON
ROBERT SIMPSON
Affiliation:
Monash University School of Philosophy and Bioethics, Building 11, Monash UniversityVIC 3800, Australia e-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

Several recent critiques of theodicy have incorporated some form of moral objection to the theodical enterprise, in which the critic argues that one ought not to engage in the practice of theodicy. In defending theodical practice against the moral critique, Atle O. Søvik argues that the moral critique (1) begs the question against theodicy, and (2) misapprehends the implications of the claim that it is inappropriate to espouse a theodicy in certain situations. In this paper I suggest some sympathetic emendations for Søvik's theodical apologetic, but I argue against Søvik's claim that the moral critique of theodicy is altogether irrelevant.

Type
Articles
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 45 , Issue 3 , September 2009 , pp. 339 - 346
Copyright
Copyright © 2009 Cambridge University Press

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References

Notes

1. Søvik, Atle O. ‘Why almost all moral critique of theodicies is misplaced’, Religious Studies, 44 (2008), 479–486.CrossRefGoogle Scholar All in-text references are to this paper. In the notes Søvik provides a useful list of references in which some form of the moral critique of theodicy can be found. Two recent papers could be added to Søvik's list: Felderhof, Marcus C. ‘Evil: theodicy or resistance?’, Scottish Journal of Theology, 57 (2004), 397–412CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Mesle, C. Robert ‘Suffering, meaning and the welfare of children: what do theodicies do?’, American Journal of Theology and Philosophy, 25 (2004), 247–264.Google Scholar

2. A further example from D. Z. Phillips's critique of theodicy may be useful in order to show how a purely consequentialist understanding of the moral critique can misrepresent some aspects of that critique. In his The Problem of Evil and the Problem of God (London: SCM Press, 2004), 39, Phillips criticizes an example used by the theodicist Stephen T. Davis to illustrate his view about how people who suffer terribly in this life may regard their earthly suffering from a post-mortem perspective; see Stephen T. Davis ‘Free will and evil’, in idem (ed.) Encountering Evil: Live Options in Theodicy (Louisville KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001), 84–85. According to Davis, those who suffer now will one day view their suffering the way he (Davis) views a major embarrassment he experienced as a high-school student. At the time, Davis says, his embarrassment felt unbearably bad, but now he sees that his ordeal was not so terrible. Phillips takes issue with this example, not because he thinks that it will (or could) have harmful consequences, but rather because he thinks it trivializes evil and suffering. In his use of an example like this, Phillips says, Davis ‘fails to take the Holocaust seriously’. If one just thinks of the moral critique in terms of worries about the practical consequences of espousing a theodicy, I think one will fail to grasp the animus of Phillips's objection here.

3. See Richard Swinburne Providence and the Problem of Evil (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), particularly ch. 13, 237–258.

4. For instance, see Swinburne's and Phillips's debate in Stuart C. Brown (ed.) Reason and Religion (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1977).

5. See Terrence W. Tilley The Evils of Theodicy (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 1991), 244–247; Mesle ‘Suffering, meaning and the welfare of children’, 259.

6. Such attitudes are evident in John Hick's and Stephen T. Davis's replies to Robert Mesle's moral critique of theodicy. See Hick, John ‘Response to Mesle’, American Journal of Theology and Philosophy, 25 (2004), 265–269Google Scholar; Davis, Stephen T. ‘Truth and action in theodicy: A reply to C. Robert Mesle’, American Journal of Theology and Philosophy, 25 (2004), 270–275.Google Scholar

7. A concise version of this argument is given in Surin, Kenneth ‘Theodicy?’, Harvard Theological Review, 76 (1983), 225–247.Google Scholar

8. For example, see O'Connor, David ‘In defence of theoretical theodicy’, Modern Theology, 5 (1988), 61–74.CrossRefGoogle Scholar According to O'Connor, theistic belief has a cognitive dimension that can be properly distinguished from its practical dimensions. The distinction of a theoretical problem of evil from the practical problem of evil, O'Connor argues, is justified since the cognitive aspect of theism calls for an explicitly theoretical response to arguments from evil.

9. When I say that theodicies are at odds with prevailing attitudes about evil, or that they undermine our usual unreflective value judgements, I am not suggesting (as some critics have) that theodicies undermine our motivation to (e.g.) try to cure diseases, or prevent acts of evil being perpetrated against others. A rather unsophisticated theodicy might be seen to undermine such imperatives, but generally speaking, theodicists are careful to include in their accounts some explanation as to why humans still have an obligation to try to prevent evil, even though God is justified in permitting evil. Hick and Davis both address this issue in response to Mesle's criticisms. See Hick ‘Response to Mesle’; Davis, ‘Truth and action in theodicy’.