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On grounding God's knowledge of the probable

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 May 2012

JENNIFER JENSEN
JENNIFER JENSEN*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Colorado, Colorado Springs, CO 80918, USA e-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

A common objection to the Molinist account of divine providence states that counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (CCFs) lack grounds. Some Molinists appeal to brute counterfactual facts about the subject of the CCF in order to ground CCFs. Others argue that CCFs are grounded by the subject's actions in nearby worlds. In this article, I argue that Open Theism's account of divine providence employs would-probably conditionals that are most plausibly grounded by either brute facts about the subject of these conditionals or non-actual entities. As a result, Open Theism's revision of the traditional notion of divine providence is unmotivated. The Molinist can ground CCFs just as easily as the Openist can ground would-probably conditionals but the Molinist has the advantage of maintaining a robust account of divine providence.

Type
Articles
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 49 , Issue 1 , March 2013 , pp. 65 - 83
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012

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