Kierkegaard On Doctrine: A Post–Modern Interpretation

Steven M. Emmanuel

doi:10.1017/S0034412500019909

Kierkegaard On Doctrine: A Post–Modern Interpretation

Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 October 2008

Steven M. Emmanuel

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Steven M. Emmanuel: Affiliation:
University of California, Riverside

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Though Kierkegaard never explicitly formulated a theory of religious doctrine, he did have a clear position on the role that Christian doctrine ought to play in the lives of believers. Briefly stated, he maintained that Christianity, as a human activity, involves more than merely believing certain propositions about matters of fact. The doctrines of Christianity take on a true religious significance only when they are given the power to transform the lives of those who accept them; only when they are given expression in the existence of the believer. This was, however, far from evident to Kierkegaard's theological contemporaries who, in the collective absentmindedness of the age, sought to replace the Christian virtue of faith with the philosophical ideal of objective knowledge.

Type: Research Article
Information: Religious Studies , Volume 25 , Issue 3 , September 1989 , pp. 363 - 378

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034412500019909 [Opens in a new window]
Copyright: Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1989

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^{page 363 note 1} Lindbeck, George, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1984).Google Scholar

^{page 363 note 2} Ibid. p. 18.

^{page 364 note 1} Ibid. p. 35.

^{page 364 note 2} Ibid. p. 81.

^{page 365 note 1} Ibid. p. 35.

^{page 365 note 2} Ibid. p. 33.

^{page 366 note 1} Ibid. pp. 64–8.

^{page 366 note 2} I owe this point to Barrett, Lee C., ‘Theology as Grammar: Regulative Principles or Paradigms and Practices’, Modern Theology (1988), 156.Google Scholar

^{page 366 note 3} Lindbeck, op. cit. p. 68.

^{page 366 note 4} Ibid.

^{page 366 note 5} Austin, J. L., ‘Performative Utterances’, in his Philosophical Papers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970).Google Scholar

^{page 367 note 1} Lindbeck, op. cit. p. 65.

^{page 367 note 2} Lindbeck, op. cit. p. 66.

^{page 367 note 3} Ibid.

^{page 367 note 4} Ibid. p. 64.

^{page 367 note 5} Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology, and Religious Belief (University of California Press, 1983), p. 57.Google Scholar

^{page 367 note 6} Ibid. p. 54.

^{page 367 note 7} Ibid. p. 56.

^{page 367 note 8} Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Culture and Value, translated by Winch, Peter (University of Chicago Press, 1980), p. 33eGoogle Scholar

^{page 368 note 1} Lindbeck, op. cit. pp. 119–20.

^{page 368 note 2} Culture and Value, p. 29c

^{page 368 note 3} Lindbeck, op. cit. p. 33.

^{page 368 note 4} Ibid. p. 10.

^{page 368 note 5} Lindbeck, op. cit. p. 131.

^{page 368 note 6} Ibid. p. 42.

^{page 368 note 7} Culture and Value, p. 53c

^{page 368 note 8} Ibid. p. 64c

^{page 368 note 9} Ibid. p. 53c

^{page 369 note 1} Lindbeck, op. cit. p. 120.

^{page 369 note 8} Concluding Unscientific Postscript, translated by Swenson, David and Lowrie, Walter (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974), p. 331Google Scholar (SV x, p. 68).

^{page 369 note 3} Ibid. p. 332 (SV x, p. 69).

^{page 369 note 4} Ibid. p. 19 (SV x, pp. 18–19).

^{page 369 note 5} Ibid. p. 537 (SV x, p. 270).

^{page 369 note 6} Ibid. p. 29 (SV ix, p. 24).

^{page 369 note 7} Ibid. p. 27 (SV ix, p. 26).

^{page 370 note 1} Ibid.

^{page 370 note 2} Ibid. p. 25 (SV ix, p. 24).

^{page 370 note 3} Ibid. p. 30 (SV ix, p. 29).

^{page 370 note 4} Ibid. p. 31 (SVix, p. 30). Cf. Wittgenstein's remark: ‘The historical accounts in the Gospels might, historically speaking, be demonstrably false and yet belief would lose nothing by this… because historical proof (the historical proof-game) is irrelevant to belief.’ [Culture and Value, p. 32c]

^{page 370 note 5} CUP, p. 37 (SV ix, p. 36).

^{page 371 note 1} Ibid. p. 178 (SV ix, p. 166).

^{page 371 note 2} Ibid. p. 193 (SV ix, p. 179).

^{page 371 note 3} Ibid. p. 339n. (SV x, pp. 75–6).

^{page 371 note 4} Ibid. p. 193 (SV ix, p. 179).

^{page 371 note 5} Ibid. pp. 184–8 (SV ix, pp. 171–5).

^{page 372 note 1} Culture and Value, p. 32c

^{page 372 note 2} Philosophical Fragments, translated by Swenson, David and revised by Hong, Howard (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 108Google Scholar (SV vi, pp. 79–80).

^{page 372 note 3} Lectures and Conversations, p. 57.

^{page 372 note 4} CUP, p. 189 (SV ix, p. 176).

^{page 372 note 5} Kierkegaard's, SorenJournals and Papers, 7 vols. edited and translated by , Howard and Hong, Edna (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1967–1978), vol. 1, p. 107Google Scholar (ix A 32).

^{page 372 note 6} Training in Christianity, translated by Lowrie, Walter (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975). pp. 200–2.Google Scholar

^{page 372 note 7} CUP, p. 116 (SV ix, p. 108).

^{page 373 note 1} See, for example, Pojman, Louis P., The Logic of Subjectivity (University of Alabama Press, 1984), pp. 70–1.Google Scholar

^{page 373 note 1} CUP, p. 7011. (SV ix, p. 66).

^{page 373 note 3} Training in Christianity, p. 201. Cf. Armed Neutrality and An Open Letter, translated by , Howard and Hong, Edna (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1968), p. 66.Google Scholar

^{page 373 note 4} See, for example, Kierkegaard's discussion of Adler in On Authority and Revelation, translated by Lowrie, Walter (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1955).Google Scholar

^{page 374 note 1} Lindbeck, op. tit. p. 51.

^{page 374 note 2} SKJP, vol. 2, p. 97 (vii¹ A 139).

^{page 375 note 1} Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 595–6.Google Scholar

^{page 375 note 2} ‘Kierkegaard's Pragmatist Faith’, which was presented to the Kierkegaard Seminar at its annual meeting held in conjunction with the American Academy of Religion, December 1987.

^{page 375 note 3} Cf. Hick's, John use of the Kantian model in Philosophy of Religion (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1983), pp. 118–21.Google Scholar

^{page 375 note 4} Lindbeck, op. at. p. 65.

^{page 376 note 1} Ibid. p. 18.

^{page 377 note 1} Urmson, J. O., ‘Performative Utterances’, in Contemporary Perspectives in Philosophy of Language, edited by French Uehling, and Wettstein (University of Minnesota Press, 1977), pp. 260–7.Google Scholar

^{page 377 note 2} Urmson distinguishes three basic types of act: natural, rule-bound, and conventional. A natural act is defined as any act that can be performed in the absence of rules, principles, laws, or conventions (such as eating, running, or walking). A rule-bound act is defined as any act which involves obedience to or breach of some rule, principle, law, or convention which binds the agent of the action. A conventional act is defined as an act which can be performed only following some rule, principle, or convention that the performance of some arbitrary natural act is the performance of that conventional act.

^{page 377 note 3} Urmson, J. O., op. cit. p. 263.Google Scholar

^{page 377 note 4} Ibid. pp. 264–5.

^{page 377 note 5} Ibid. p. 267.

^{page 378 note 1} CUP, p. 181 (SV ix, p. 169).

^{page 378 note 2} Ibid. pp. 179–80 (SV ix, pp. 167–8).

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