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Got to have soul

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 October 2006

JOSEPH A. BALTIMORE
JOSEPH A. BALTIMORE
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 5185 Helen C. White Hall, 600 N Park St, Madison, WI 53706
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Abstract

Kevin Corcoran offers an account of how one can be a physicalist about human persons, deny temporal gaps in the existence of persons, and hold that there is an afterlife. I argue that Corcoran's account both violates the necessity of metaphysical identity and implausibly makes an individual's existence dependent on factors wholly extrinsic to the individual. Corcoran's defence is considered, as well as Stephen Davis's suggestions on how an account like Corcoran's can defend itself against these concerns. It is shown, however, that the difficulties remain in full force and, therefore, that Corcoran's account fails to reconcile physicalism, no gappy existence, and an afterlife.

Type
Research Article
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 42 , Issue 4 , December 2006 , pp. 417 - 430
Copyright
© 2005 Cambridge University Press

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