Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-hc48f Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-26T06:15:42.655Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Craig on the actual infinite

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 June 2002

WES MORRISTON
WES MORRISTON
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Colorado at Boulder, 169 Hellems, Campus Box 232, Boulder, CO 80309-0232
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

In a series of much discussed articles and books, William Lane Craig defends the view that the past could not consist in a beginningless series of events. In the present paper, I cast a critical eye on just one part of Craig's case for the finitude of the past – viz. his philosophical argument against the possibility of actually infinite sets of objects in the ‘real world’. I shall try to show that this argument is unsuccessful. I shall also take a close look at several considerations that are often thought to favour the possibility of an actual infinite, arguing in each case that Craig's response is inadequate.

Type
Research Article
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 38 , Issue 2 , June 2002 , pp. 147 - 166
Copyright
© 2002 Cambridge University Press

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)