Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 October 2008
In what follows I argue for two interrelated theses: (1) that early Buddhism is not a form of empiricism, and (2) that consequently there is no basis for an early Buddhist apologetic which contrasts an empirical early Buddhism with either a metaphysical Hinduism on the one hand, or with a baseless Christianity on the other.
page 151 note 1 Jayatilleke, K. N., Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge (London: Allen and Unwin, 1964), pp. 463–4.Google Scholar
page 151 note 2 Kalupahana, D. J., Buddhist Philosophy (Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1976), pp. 3–24Google Scholar, re. metaphysical Hinduism/empirical Buddhism; Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism (Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1975), p. 185.Google Scholar
page 151 note 3 Dharmasiri, Gunapala, A Buddhist Critique of the Christian Concept of God (Colombo, Lake House, 1974), pp. 298–9, 291.Google Scholar
page 151 note 4 Jayatilleke, Ibid.
page 153 note 1 Jayatilleke, ibid. p. 403.
page 153 note 2 Jayatilleke, ibid. pp. 403–404.
page 154 note 1 Davids, T. W. Rhys and Stede, William, The Pali Text Society's Pali English Dictionary (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972), pp. 292 and 321.Google Scholar
page 154 note 2 Kalupahana, Causality, ibid..
page 154 note 3 I argue this in chapters 2 and 5 of ‘Rationality and Mind in Early Buddhism’ (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of London, King's College, 1981).
page 154 note 4 Majjhima Nikāya 1, 73.Google Scholar
page 156 note 1 Even Ch'an (Zen) Buddhists, who sometimes emphasize that attachment to the Triple Jewel is nevertheless attachment and are capable of making irreverent comments about the Triple Jewel, are single-mindedly devoted to the Buddhist path as they see it.
page 157 note 1 Dharmasiri, , op. cit. p. 299.Google Scholar
page 157 note 2 ibid. p. 291.