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Théorie des jeux et genèse des institutions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

Bernard Walliser
Bernard Walliser*
Affiliation:
École Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées, Paris
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Résumé

Les institutions, conçues comme des entités collectives autonomes contribuant à la régulation du système socio-économique, ont été progressivement endogénéisées d’abord par la théorie économique, puis par la théorie des jeux. Elles ont pour rôle de résoudre des problèmes de coordination entre les agents, en particulier ceux qui découlent de l’absence, de la multiplicité ou de la non optimalité des équilibres spontanés. Pour ce faire, elles peuvent d’abord multiplier le nombre d’équilibres possibles, ensuite sélectionner l’un d’entre eux, en étant autant que possible auto-validées par les agents et non imposées de l’extérieur. Cependant, même si l’institution peut soutenir un équilibre spécifique, il faut rendre compte de sa genèse sinon par le pur raisonnement des agents, du moins par un processus d’apprentissage ou d'évolution.

Summary

Summary

Considered as autonomous collective entities contributing to the regulation of socio-economic system, institutions were progressively endogenized by economic theory and by game theory afterwards. Their rôle is to resolve agent’s coordination problems, which stem either from absence, multiplicity or non optimality of spontaneous equilibria. To this end, institutions extend the set of available equilibria first, then they select one of them, while remaining as much as possible selfvalidating and not externally compelling. However, although an institution can sustain a specific equilibrium, its concrete emergence has to be explained, if not by a pure reasoning of the agents, at least by a learning or an evolution process.

Keywords

011026036011026036
Type
Research Article
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 55 , Issue 4 , 1989 , pp. 339 - 364
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 1989 

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References

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