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Site collectif polluant et monopole: localisation et tarification

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

Denis Lescop
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Résumé

Un groupe d'agents décide de mettre à sa disposition un site collectif polluant. Pour ce faire, ils font appel à une entreprise chargée de la localisation et de la construction de l'installation. Celle-ci leur propose une procédure de localisation/tarification soumise à l'approbation de tous les agents. Dans un tel contexte, l'entreprise est forcée à internaliser les dommages subis par les agents dans sa fonction de coût: ce phénomène rappelle l'achat de droit à polluer. En information incomplète, les mécanismes incitatifs optimaux indiquent l'existence d'inefficacités dues à l'attribution d'une rente informationnelle à chaque agent: la localisation échoue alors qu'elle aurait profité à tout le monde. Dans deux applications (externalités diffuses et ex-ternalités locales) du modèle général, l'enchère optimale est complètement caractérisée.

Summary

Summary

A community of agents decide to provide itself with a noxious facility. To do so, they call on a firm that will be in charge of the siting and the construction of the facility. In such a context, the firm propose a siting/pricing mechanism to the community. Under incomplete information, we show that optimal mechanisms facilitating the siting and pricing of the facility exhibit allocative inefficiencies due to the informational rent given to each agents. In two cases drawn from the general cases (diffuse extenailities and local externalities), we fully characterize the optimal auction.

Keywords

enchèresexternalités négativesbiens collectifsC72D44H41auctionsnegative externalitiescollective goodsC72D44H41
Type
Research Article
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 70 , Issue 1 , 2004 , pp. 79 - 107
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 2004 

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Footnotes

*

CRESE, Université de Besançon, UFR SJEPG, 45 D, Avenue de I'Observatoire, 25030 Besançon cedex, France. E-mail: [email protected]

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