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Réforme de la protection de l'emploi et inégalités face au chômage dans un modèle d'appariement*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

Olivier Charlot  and
Franck Malherbet
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Résumé

Cet article s'intéresse aux effets liés à l'introduction d'un système de modulation des cotisations patronales à l'assurance chômage (ou experience rating) sur le niveau et la structure du chômage par qualification. Nous construisons pour cela un modèle d'appariement dans lequel l'évolution de la demande de travail, les décisions de création et destruction d'emplois, ainsi que l'évolution des taxes destinées à financer l'assurance chômage sont endogènes. Dans ce cadre, la protection de l'emploi a des effets qui peuvent être différenciés selon le niveau de qualification considéré. L'introduction d'un système de modulation des cotisations employeur à l'assurance chômage pourrait améliorer le fonctionnement du marché du travail; l'importance des éventuels effets indésirables liés à ce système dépend de la capacité à substituer la taxe d'expérience rating aux dispositifs de protection de l'emploi déjà en place. La hausse des incitations à se qualifier réduit en partie l'importance de ce problème.

Summary

Summary

This article studies the impact of experience rating on unemployment for skilled and unskilled workers. In this purpose, we build a dual matching model with endogenous job creation, job rejection, job destruction and endogeneous taxes aimed at financing the UI system.

In this framework, the impact of employment protection differs for skilled and unskilled workers; experience rating may improve the labour market outcomes, and the existence of some undesirable effects depends on the degree of substitution between the experience rating system and existing employment protection schemes. In any case, the potential problems can be alleviated by the induced rise in the return to skill.

Keywords

Destruction d'emploiscoûts de licenciementexperience ratingJob destructionFiring costsExperience rating

JEL classification

J60: General I20: General J20: General
Type
Research Article
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 76 , Issue 1 , 2010 , pp. 57 - 112
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 2010 

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Footnotes

**

Université des Antilles et de la Guyana, LEAD et CIRPEE. UFR SJE, Campus de Fouillole, BP 270, 97157, Pointe-à-Pitre, Guadeloupe. Courriel: [email protected]

***

THEMA - CNRS - Université de Cergy-Pontoise, IZA and fRDB ; Courriel: [email protected]

*

Nous remercions Pierre Cahuc, Bruno Decreuse, Pierre Granier, Olivier L'Haridon et Benoit Lorel, ainsi que les participants au séminaire marché du travail à EUREQua, ceux du groupe de travail Macroéconomie du GREQAM pour leurs commentaires et suggestions avisés sur une version antérieure de cet article. Nous remercions également deux rapporteurs anonymes de cette revue pour I'ensemble de leurs remarques. Les éventuelles erreurs ou omissions résiduelles demeurent de notre responsabilité.

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