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R&D rivalry Vs R&D cooperation under uncertainty

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

John Beath ,
Yannis Katsoulacos  and
David Ulph
John Beath
Affiliation:
Bristol University
Yannis Katsoulacos
Affiliation:
Liverpool University
David Ulph
Affiliation:
Bristol University
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Résumé

Cet article analyse si les dépenses de recherche et développement (R & D) seront supérieures ou inférieures sous un « research joint venture » (RJV) ou dans un cadre de concurrence en R & D ; et si les firmes préféreront le premier mode d’organisation au second. Si l’imitation d’une invention s’avère difficile, la réponse à la dernière question dépendra de l’importance relative de deux forces opposées : alors que la coopération va renforcer les gains attendus via un « effet de coordination » positif, elle va également intensifier la concurrence rencontrée par l’innovateur sur le marché des produits en facilitant l’accès des firmes concurrentes à la technologie la plus récente. Par contre, lorsque l’imitation est facile, les firmes préféreront toujours un accord de recherche jointe (RJV) à une concurrence en R & D.

Summary

Summary

We consider whether or not R&D expenditures will be greater or less under a research joint venture (RJV) than under R&D competition and whether or not firms will always find the former preferable to the latter. With imitation difficult, the answer to the latter question depends on the relative strength of conflicting forces : whilst cooperation will increase expected payoffs through a positive “coordination effect” it will also intensify the competition faced by the innovator in the product market by enabling firms to gain access to the most recent technology. With imitation easy, on the other hand, firms will always prefer an RJV to R&D competition.

Keywords

621621
Type
Research Article
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 54 , Issue 4 , 1988 , pp. 373 - 384
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 1988 

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Footnotes

1

We wish to thank two anonymous referee whose comments on an earlier version led to substantial improvements in presentation.

References

REFERENCES

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