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Lobbying for carbon permits in Europe
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 August 2016
Summary
Using cross-sector and cross-country data, this paper evidences that rent seeking influenced the allocation of CO2 emission permits in the two first phases of the European emissions trading scheme. Industry lobbies effectively used the 'job loss' and 'competitiveness' arguments, as unemployment proxy variables significantly impacted the allocation in both phases, and carbon intensity influenced it in the second phase. The countries that adopted a partial auction scheme also gave relatively more permits and in particular to the politically more powerful sectors. This suggests a compensation mechanism and supports the assumption of a political tradeoff between the quantity of permits issued and the decision between free grant and auction. It also confirms that the initial allocation is not neutral in the presence of special interest lobbying.
Résumé
À l'aide de données sectorielles et sur plusieurs pays, cet article met en évidence l'influence de comportements de recherche d'une rente sur l'allocation des permis d'émission de C02 durant les deux premières phases du système européen d'échange de quotas d'émission. Les lobbies industriels ont utilisé efficacement les arguments de « perte d'emploi » et de « compétitivité », les variables « proxy » de chômage ayant affecté significativement l'allocation dans les deux phases, et l'intensité carbone l'ayant influencée au cours de la seconde phase. Les pays ayant adopté un plan de vente partielle aux enchères ont également donné relativement plus de permis et en particulier aux secteurs les plus puissants politiquement. Ces résultats suggèrent un mécanisme de compensation et soutiennent l'hypothèse d'un arbitrage politique entre la quantité de permis créée et la décision entre distribution gratuite et vente aux enchères. Ils confirment également que l'allocation initiale n'est pas neutre en présence du lobbying en faveur d'intérêts particuliers.
Keywords
- Type
- Research Article
- Information
- Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 80 , Issue 1 , 2014 , pp. 61 - 87
- Copyright
- Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 2015
Footnotes
*
Kedge Business School and GREQAM, Aix-Marseille University. Contact: Domaine de Luminy BP 921, 13288 Marseille Cedex 9, France, Tel.: +33(0) 491 827 309, Fax.: +33(0) 491 827 983, E-mail: [email protected].
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