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L'émergence d'une banque supérieure sous le régime de la liberté bancaire

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

Laurent Le Maux
Laurent Le Maux*
Affiliation:
Université de Paris VIII
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Résumé

La théorie de la banque centrale analyse la hiérarchisation bancaire dans le cadre du monopole d'émission de billets de banque. Or sous le régime de la liberté bancaire dans lequel les banques peuvent émettre des billets et des dépôts à vue sans restrictions quantitatives ou autres, la structure bancaire converge également vers la hiérarchisation. L'émergence d'une banque supérieure intervenant en tant que prêteur en dernier ressort est alors un phénomène spontané et constitue une innovation du système de paiement afin d'endiguer les ruées de remboursement, et non une création du législateur ou une conséquence de la réglementation. Afin d'établir un système bancaire rigoureusement décentralisé, c'est-à-dire sans banque supérieure, les chambres de compensation doivent respecter des règles très strictes leur interdisant de créer de la monnaie supérieure. Sans ces règles et sans cette intervention du législateur, la structure hiérarchisée du système bancaire est alors définitive.

Summary

Summary

The emergence of the high-powered money issued by a central bank have been explain only in the case of a privileged bank having the monopoly of note issue. Yet, hierarchical banking system can be explained in the case of free banking in a banking system where banks are still free to issue notes and demand deposit without legal restrictions. The emergence of the lender of last resort is then a spontaneous phenomenon and can be interpreted as a market innovation to contain bank runs, and not a creation of legislation or consequences of legal restrictions. By contrast, to establish a perfectly decentralised free banking system, i.e. without higher bank and only with free banks issuing credit money, the clearinghouse ought to respect strictly rules wich prohibit them to create high-powered money. Without these rules, and especially the lOOclearinghouse, the banking structure is definitively hierarchical.

Keywords

Banque libreChambre de compensationPrêteur en dernier ressortE51E58N11Free bankingClearinghouseLender of last resortE51E58N11
Type
Research Article
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 70 , Issue 2 , 2004 , pp. 193 - 221
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 2004 

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