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Legal structure and strategic regulation of intellectual property : Who pays for R&D in arts markets?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

Andrew E. Burke
Andrew E. Burke*
Affiliation:
University of Edinburgh
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Summary

The paper addresses the issue of who pays for the cost of creating artistic works and other forms of intellectual property. It examines the effect of current legal structure on regulatory performance in markets for intellectual property; specifically the effects of sequential and partial regulation. These entail the regulation of multiple market intellectual property on a “market-by-market” basis (sequential regulation) where the performance in other markets for the same intellectual property is taken as given (partial regulation). The analysis demonstrates that this form of regulation is sub-optimal and creates an incentive for copyright and antitrust laws to be employed strategically by consumers, firms and regulators. In particular, it creates an incentive to use domestic regulation as an international strategic device. The theoretical exposition is augmented by an analysis of two regulatory decisions relating to the US market for music performance rights which reflect the strategic implications of partial and sequential regulation.

Résumé

Résumé

L’article s’intéresse à la question de savoir qui supporte les coûts de la création d’œuvres artistiques et d’autres formes de propriété intellectuelle. Il examine les effets de la structure légale sur les résultats des réglementations régissant les marchés de propriété intellectuelle. L’attention se porte particulièrement sur les conséquences du caractère séquentiel et de ces règles. L’analyse démontre que cette forme de réglementation est sous-optimale et incite les agents à une utilisation stratégique des lois antitrust et des lois sur le copyright. En particulier, elle crée une incitation à utiliser les réglementations domestiques comme un instrument de stratégie internationale. L’article se termine par l’étude de deux décisions prises aux Etats-Unis à propos du marché des droits de représentation musicale. Les implications de la réglementation de type partielle et séquentielle y sont soulignés.

Keywords

Strategic regulationcopyrightmusic performance rightsK2L4L5K2L4L5
Type
Research Article
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 66 , Issue 2 , 2000 , pp. 193 - 211
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 2000 

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Footnotes

*

This paper has been presented at ACEI Conference in Barcelona in 1998, the BIGACE Conference at the Department for Media Culture and Sport, London in 1998 and the ICARE Conference in Venice in 1998. The author is grateful for useful comments by participants at these conferences, two anonymous referees and Victor Ginsburgh. A disclaimer applies.

References

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