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La coopération se réduit-elle à un contrat? Une approche procédurale des relations contractuelles*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

Camille Chaserant
Camille Chaserant*
Affiliation:
TIPS-FORUM, Université de Paris X-Nanterre
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Résumé

Cet article propose une analyse de la coopération dans les relations contractuelles à partir d'une hypothèse de rationalité procédurale. Suivant la théorie du framing de Lindenberg, nous définissons l'égoïsme éclairé comme la rationalité mise en œuvre lors des relations contractuelles. La coopération s'explique alors par la volonté de maintenir la relation qui diminue la saillance du cadre de gain; cette volonté est entretenue par l'échange de si-gnaux relationnels entre les parties. Si les possibilités d'opportunisme sont importantes, la coopération nécessite d'être soutenue, d'abord par la formalisation d'un contrat puis,plus les enjeux augmentent, par l'encastrement dans un réseau. Des mécanismes de réputation et de sélection peuvent alors être mobilisés. Nous montrons que dans une telle approche, l'acceptation par les parties de l'incomplétude inévitable de leur contrat est un signal positif, nécessaire à l'établissement de la coopération.

Summary

Summary

This paper analyses cooperation in contractual relationships assuming procedural rationality. We use Lindenberg's framing theory to define enlightened self-interest as the rationality in action in contractual relationships. Then cooperation is explained by the willingness to pursue the relationship which, from the background, decreases the saliency of the gain frame. This willingness is supported by a process of mutual relational signalling. When temptations of opportunism are important, cooperation needs to be embedded, first in a selection one can then be mobilised. In this framework, we show that the acceptation of contractual incompleteness by the parties is a positive signal, which is necessary to generate cooperation.

Keywords

rationalitécadragecontratsincomplétuderéseauxD810L140rationalitycontractsincompletenessnetworksD810L140
Type
Research Article
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 68 , Issue 4 , 2002 , pp. 481 - 510
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 2002 

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Footnotes

**

LAEDIX-FORUM, Université de Paris X-Nanterre, 200, avenue de la République 92001 Nanterre Cedex - tél: (33) 01.40.97.47.66 - Fax: (33) 01.40.97.71.83 - email: [email protected]

*

Cet article reprend certains developpements de la troisiéme partie de ma thése, dont l'argumentation a bénéficié des nombreuses discussions avec S. Lindenberg, O. Favereau et E. Brousseau. Je tiens ici à les remercier ainsi que deux rapporteurs anonymes pour leurs remarques et suggestions.

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