Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-dlnhk Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-28T10:07:11.929Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Interpreting Common Ownership

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

Hervé Moulin
Hervé Moulin*
Affiliation:
Duke University
Get access

Summary

The paper surveys, without proofs, recent axiomatic results on the utilization of common property resources, by this author and some others. Problems discussed include the division of unproduced commodities (the traditional fair division problem), and the cooperative production of a private or public good.

Axioms contrast No Envy with two monotonicity properties, respectively when the population owning the resources in common increases, and when these resources themselves grow.

Résumé

Résumé

Notre article examine d’une manière critique quelques résultats axiomatiques récents de travaux sur l’utilisation des ressources en propriété commune. Il discute notamment des problèmes de répartition de biens non-produits et de la production coopérative de biens, qu’ils soient privés ou publics. Des axiomes contrastent l’absence d’envie avec deux propriétés de monotonicité, quand la population qui possède les ressources en commun augmente et quand ce sont les ressources ellesmêmes qui augmentent.

Keywords

021024025021024025
Type
Research Article
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 56 , Issue 3-4: A Special Issue in Honor of Professor A. Sen : Alternatives to Welfarism , 1990 , pp. 303 - 326
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 1990 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

*

Useful criticisms by an anonymous referee are gratefully acknowledged.

References

Baumol, W., Panzar, J. and Willig, R. (1982), Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure, New York, Harcourt-Brace-Jovanovich.Google Scholar
Chichilnisky, G. and Thomson, W. (1987), The Walrasian Mechanism from Equal Division is not Monotonic with Respect to Variations in the Number of Consumers, Journal of Public Economics, 32, pp. 119–124.Google Scholar
Cohen, G. A. (1986), Self-Ownership, World Ownership and Equality, Social Philosophy and Policy, 3, Spring, pp. 77–96.Google Scholar
Crawford, V. (1979), A Procedure for Generating Pareto Efficient Egalitarian Solution, Econometrica, vol. 47(1), pp. 49–60.Google Scholar
Dworkin, R. (1981), What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 10(4), pp. 283–345.Google Scholar
Elster, J. (1989), Incentives and Local Justice, mimeo, University of Chicago.Google Scholar
Foley, D. (1967), Resource Allocation and the Public Sector, Yale Economic Essays, vol 7(1), pp. 45–98.Google Scholar
Graham, L.D. and Marshall, R. (1987), Collusive Bidder Behavior at Single, Object Second-Price and English Auctions, Journal of Political Economy vol. 95(6), pp. 1217–1239.Google Scholar
Ichiishi, T. and Quinzii, M. (1983), Decentralization for the Core of a Production Economy With Increasing Returns, International Economic Review, vol. 24, pp. 397–412.Google Scholar
Kaneko, M. (1977), The Ratio Equilibrium and a Voting Game in a Public Good Economy, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 16(2), pp. 123–136.Google Scholar
Moulin, H. (1987a), Egalitarian Equivalent Cost Sharing of a Public Good, Econometrica, vol. 55(4), pp. 965–977.Google Scholar
Moulin, H. (1987b), A Core Selection for Pricing a Single Output Monopoly, Rand Journal of Economics, vol. 18(3), pp. 397–407.Google Scholar
Moulin, H. (1989a), Welfare Bounds and Fair Allocation of Private Goods, mimeo, Virginia Polytechnic Institute.Google Scholar
Moulin, H. (1989b), Uniform Externalities : Two Axioms for Fair Allocation, Journal of Public Economics, forthcoming.Google Scholar
Moulin, H. (1989c), All Sorry to Disagree: a General Principle for the Provision of Non-rival Goods, mimeo, Duke University.Google Scholar
Moulin, H. (1989d), Cores and Large Cores when Population Varies, International Journal of Game Theory, forthcoming.Google Scholar
Moulin, H. and Thomson, W. (1988), Can Everyone Benefit from Growth? Two difficulties, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 17, pp. 339–345.Google Scholar
Moulin, H. and Roemer, J., (1989), Public Ownership of the External World and Private Ownership of Self, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 97(2), pp. 347–367.Google Scholar
Moulin, H. (1990), Joint Ownership of a Convex Technology, Review of Economic Studies, (57), pp. 439–452.Google Scholar
Musgrave, R. and Peacock, A. (1958), Classics in the Theory of Public Finance, Macmillan, London.Google Scholar
Olson, M. and Zeckhauser, R. (1966), An Economic Theory of Alliances, Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 48, pp. 226–279.Google Scholar
Otsuki, M. (1989), On Distributive Fairness in Lindahl Systems and Other Concepts of Equity, mimeo, Tohoku University.Google Scholar
Quinzii, M. (1982), An Existence Theorem for the Core of a Productive Economy with Increasing Returns, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 28, pp. 32–50.Google Scholar
Roemer, J. (1986), The Mismarriage of Bargaining Theory and Distributive Justice, Ethics, 97, pp. 88–110.Google Scholar
Roemer, J. and Silvestre, J. (1988), Public Ownership: Three Proposals for Resource Allocation, mimeo, University of California, Davis.Google Scholar
Sebenius, J. (1984), Negotiating the Law of the Sea, Cambridge, Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Sharkey, W. (1982), The Theory of Natural Monopoly, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Steinhaus, H. (1948), The Problem of Fair Division, Econometrica, vol. 16, pp. 101–104.Google Scholar
Thomson, W. (1983), The Fair Division of a Fixed Supply Among a Growing Population, Maths Operations Research, vol. 8, pp. 319–326.Google Scholar
Thomson, W. (1988), A Study of Choice Correspondences in Economies with a Variable Number of Agents, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 46, pp. 237–254.Google Scholar
Thomson, W. and Varian, H. (1985), Theories of Justice Based on Symmetry, in: Hurwicz, L. et al (eds.), Social Goals and Social Organization, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Varian, H. (1974), Equity, Envy and Efficiency, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 29(2), pp. 217–244.Google Scholar
Weber, S. and Wiesmeth, H. (1989), Economic Models of NATO, mimeo, York University, Toronto.Google Scholar
Weizman, M. (1974), Free Access Versus Private Ownership as Alternative Systems for Managing Common Property, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 8, pp. 225–234.Google Scholar
Young, H. P. (1989), Fair Division, mimeo, University of Maryland.Google Scholar