Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-rdxmf Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-28T14:29:31.088Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Innovation et effet de remplacement du monopole : le cas des ressources non renouvelables

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

Jean-Christophe Poudou  and
LASER, CREDEN
Get access

Résumé

Selon Arrow (1962), face à une innovation de procédé (réductrice de coût) une firme monopolistique subit l'effet de remplacement à savoir que la valeur qu'elle lui accorde est sous optimale et inférieure à la valeur de compétition technologique du brevet qui lui correspond. Nous transposons cette problématique dans le cadre d'une économie exploitant une ressource épuisable. En considérant les incitations à innover immédiatement, on peut alors montrer que le résultat de sous-incitation du monopole n'est pas toujours vérifié et parfois même se renverse : le monopole minier exhibe une propension à ne pas « s'endormir sur ses lauriers » lorsque la demande de la ressource présente une élasticité « fortement » croissante. En élargissant le résultat au cas des incitations dynamiques, nous montrons que le monopole adopte parfois plus vite l'innovation que la firme en concurrence.

Summary

Summary

Considering a cost reducing innovation, Arrow (1962) shows that a firm in monopoly suffers the replacement effect, that is, its valuation of the innovation is sub-optimal and less than in a context of technological competition. We look also at this problem but within the framework of an economy exploiting an exhaustible resource. One can show that the replacement effect is not always verified and can be reversed: the mining monopoly doesn't “rest on its laurels” when the price elasticity of demand for the resource is “deeply” increasing. We discuss this result for the case of dynamic incentives to innovate and we show that, in those situations of demand, the mining monopoly innovate earlier that the competitive mining firm.

Keywords

technological choicesflexibilitytacit collusionQ30O31ressources épuisablesincitations à l'innovationmonopoleQ30O31
Type
Research Article
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 73 , Issue 1 , 2007 , pp. 55 - 75
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 2007 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

*

Université Montpellier I, UFR Sciences Economiques, Espace Richter, Avenue de la Mer, CS 79606,34960 Montpellier Cedex 2, France. Tel +33 (0)4 67 15 83 26, [email protected]

References

Références

Amigues, J.-R, Favard, P., Gaudet, G. et Moreaux, M. (1998), “On the optimal order of natural resource use when the capacity of the inexhaustible substitute is limited”, Journal of Economic Theory, 80(1), pp. 153–70.Google Scholar
Amigues, J.-P., Grimaud, A. et Moreaux, M. (2004), “Optimal endogenous sustainability with an exhautible resource through dedicated R&D”, Les Cahiers du LERNA, 04.17.154.Google Scholar
Arrow, K. (1962), Economie welfare and the allocation of resources for invention in The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity, Princeton U.P., pp. 609–626.Google Scholar
Basar, T. (1989), “Time Consistency and Robustness of Equilibria”, in Non-Cooperative Dynamic Games in Dynamic Policy Games in Economics, van der Ploeg, F. et de Zeeuw, A. (Eds), Elsevier.Google Scholar
Dasgupta, P. et Stiglitz, J.E (1982), “Market Structure and Resource Depletion : a Contribution to the Theory of Intertemporal Monopolistic Competition”, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 28, pp. 128–164.Google Scholar
Gilbert, R. et Newbery, D. (1982), “Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly”, American Economic Review, vol. 72(3), pp. 514–526.Google Scholar
Grimaud, A., Rouge, L. (2003), “Non Renewable Resources and Growth with Vertical Innovations : Optimum, Equilibrium and Economic Policies”, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, vol. 45, pp. 433–453.Google Scholar
Harris, C. et Vickers, J. (1995), “Innovation and Natural Resources : a dynamic game with uncertainty”, Rand Journal of Economics, vol. 26(3), pp. 418–430.Google Scholar
Hoel, M. (1983), “Monopoly Resource Extraction under the presence of Predetermined Substitute Production”, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 30(1), pp. 201–212 Google Scholar
Hotelling, H. (1931), “The Economics of Exhaustible Resources”, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 39(2), pp. 137–175 Google Scholar
Hung, N.M. (1978), Over-Conservation of Natural Resource Under Monopoly, mimeo.Google Scholar
Hung, N.M. et Quyen, N.V. (1993), Dynamic Timing Decisions Under Uncertainty : Essays on Invention, Innovation and Exploration in Resources Economics, vol. 406 Coll. Lectures Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1994.Google Scholar
Rotillon, G. (1981), Gestion Optimale des Ressources Epuisables avec ou sans Renouvellement, de Doctorat, Thèse, U. Panthéon Sorbonne.Google Scholar
Stiglitz, J.E. (1976), “Monopoly and the rate of extraction of Exhaustible Resources”, American Economic Review, vol. 66, pp. 655–661.Google Scholar
Sweeney, J.L. (1977), “Economics of Depletable Resources : Market Forces and Intertemporal Biais”, Review of Economic Studies, vol. 44(136), pp. 205–221 Google Scholar
Tirole, J. (1995), « Théories de l’Organisation Industrielle », Economica, Paris, (vol. 1 & II).Google Scholar
Zeckhauser, R.J. et Weinstein, M.C. (1975), “Optimal Consumption of Depletable Resources”, Quartely Journal of Economics, vol. 89(3), pp. 371–392.Google Scholar