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Evolutionary Approaches in Economics. Some Comments on Ph. Van Parijs “Le modèle économique et ses rivaux”

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

Jack Vromen*
Affiliation:
Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam
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Résumé

L’article met en avant la difficulté de percevoir où Ph. Van Parijs situe la limite entre le modèle économique — susceptible d’expliquer de nombreux phénomènes sociaux, mais pas tous — et les modèles evolutionnaires. Parfois il semble soutenir que les modèles evolutionnaires sont nécessaires pour expliquer des situations où les individus agissent sans la moindre délibération préalable. Mais à d’autres endroits il semble que ces modèles soient supposés être à même d’expliquer les «données» du modèle économique, à savoir les préférences et les croyances. Le mecanisme evolutionnaire de renforcement est analysée en détail dans l’article dans l’intention de déterminer quelle est l’interpretation correcte. Il apparait que la seconde interpretation est la plus plausible. On montre en effet que le mécanisme evolutionnaire est à la base de l’explication de la convergence des croyances des individus à condition qu’ils aient certaines preférences. Le renforcement ne présuppose pas, mais pourrait expliquer, des comportements obéissant à des règles non délibératives. On observe également que ce même mécanisme de renforcement, ainsi compris, est implicitement supposé être à l’oeuvre dans de nombreuses tentatives de développement de modèles evolutionnaires émanant d’économistes.

Summary

Summary

The paper argues that it is not clear where P. Van Parijs sets the borderline between the economic model — able of explaining many seemingly disparate, but not all, social phenomena — and evolutionary models. Sometimes it seems that evolutionary models are required in situations when people behave without a trace of deliberation. But at other times it looks as if evolutionary models are supposed to be capable of explaining the « data » of the economic model : preferences and beliefs. The evolutionary mechanism of reinforcement is analyzed thoroughly in the paper in order to find out which interpretation is the right one. It turns out that the second interpretation comes nearest. The mechanism of reinforcement is shown to underly explanations of the convergence of beliefs of individuals, provided they have certain preferences. Reinforcement does not presuppose but might explain non-deliberative rule-following. It is pointed out that the very same mechanism of reinforcement, thus understood, is tacitly assumed to be at work in several attempts by economists to develop evolutionary models.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 1992 

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References

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