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Évaluations affiliées, dotations initiales et la surenchère dans les prises de contrôle

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 January 2015

Hounwanou Dégnidé Didier
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Résumé

Nous considérons une prise de contrôle dans laquelle les motivations des repreneurs potentiels sont multiples et étudions I’impact du degré d’affiliation de leurs évaluations sur la stratégie optimale. Nous montrons que cet impact dépend du rapport des dotations initiales. Nous trouvons que lorsque les dotations initiales sont symétriques, la stratégie optimale des enchérisseurs est indépendante du degré d’affiliation de leurs évaluations. En revanche, lorsque les dotations initiales sont asymétriques, cet impact dépend du niveau du signal privé de l’enchérisseur. Si les acqueréurs potentiels surenchérissent en présence de dotations initiales, l’étendue de la surenchére décroît avec l’augmentation du degré d’affiliation lorsque le signal privé est inférieur un certain seuil. L’agressivité des enchérisseurs profite à la firme cible dont le revenu espéré augmente avec le degré d’affiliation des évaluations.

Summary

Summary

This paper examines the optimal bidding strategy in takeover contests for a target firm, and the positive correlation between the bidders‘ valuation. We consider risk neutral bidders who compete for the control of a target firm in which they get initial shareholdings. The bidder's valuation for target firm is correlated with his motivations which determine bidder's strategy.

We study bidder's optimal strategy in mixed motivations setting. Since motivations are numerous, hypothesis of affiliated value in auctions allows to study bidder's strategy. The paper shows that the impact of affiliation degree on bidder's optimal strategy depends on their private signal and on the ratio between their initial shareholdings. Particularly, we found that if a potential bidder overbids when he gets toeholds in the target firm, the extent of overbidding is not monotonically increasing with the size of toeholds and the level of private signal. There is a threshold of private signal under which the bidder is more aggressive given the size of his toeholds and above which the bidder is less aggressive. Target firm's expected revenue increases with the degree of affiliation of bidder's valuation.

Keywords

MotivationsValuationsAffiliationToeholdsOverbiddingTakeoversAllocationD44D82évaluations affiliéesdotations initialessurenchèreprises de contrdleD44D82
Type
Research Article
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 79 , Issue 3 , September 2013 , pp. 91 - 123
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 2013 

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Footnotes

*

Université de Franche Comté, CRESE, (Centre de Recherche sur les Stratégies Economiques), 30, Avenue de l’Observatoire, BP 1559, 25009 Besançon Cedex, July 19, 2013

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