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Echanges internationaux et straégies collusives

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

Alexis Jacquemin
Alexis Jacquemin*
Affiliation:
Université Catholique de Louvain
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Résumé

De nombreux travaux récents ont jeté un doute sur la capacité des modèles traditionnels de fournir une explication totalement satisfaisante des échanges internationaux. Le recours accru aux analyses d'Economie Industrielle, de concurrence imparfaite et de théorie des jeux fournit un cadre complémentaire particulièrement utile.

C'est dans ce contexte que le présent article propose quelques illustrations simples des nouvelles recherches. La première section met en lumière plusieurs aspects des relations stratégies internationales, y compris le rôle joué par les acteurs publics. La deuxième section illustre le rôle des stratégies collusives, tant privées que publiques dans les échanges internationaux.

Summary

Summary

Much of the work recently carried out casts doubt on the capacity of traditional models, linked to the Walrasian paradigm, to provide a valid explanation of international trade. Instead, increasing use is being made of industrial organisation analyses, imperfect competition theories and the theory of games.

It is against this background that this paper sets out a number of simple illustrations of this new research. The first section highlights certain aspects of international strategic relations, including the role played by the public authorities. The second illustrates private and public collusive strategies in international trade.

Keywords

410610410610
Type
Research Article
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 54 , Issue 1 , 1988 , pp. 85 - 102
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 1988 

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Footnotes

1

L’auteur est Professeur d’Economie l’UCL et Conseiller Economique auprès de la Commisson des Communautés Européennes.

References

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