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Développements récents de la littérature sur l'incohérence temporelle et la crédibilité de la politique économique

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

Bertrand Crettez  and
Anne Lavigne
Bertrand Crettez
Affiliation:
Universités de Paris I et Paris IX
Anne Lavigne
Affiliation:
Institut Orléanais de Finance
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Résumé

Ce papier présente certains développements théoriques récents sur la crédibilité des politiques économiques. Après avoir souligné les limites des analyses traditionnelles à la Barro Gordon, on expose les différentes approches utilisées pour résoudre les problèmes de crédibilité. Dans une première approche, on fait l'hypothèse que les problèmes de crédibilité sont résolus par des mécanismes intergéné-rationnels, i.e. des équilibres de Nash parfaits entre des générations représentées par des gouvernements bienveillants. La seconde approche met l'accent sur la négociation implicite entre les agents privés et le Gouvernement, négociation qui conduit à un résultat différent de la politique crédible au sens de Barro et Gordon. La troisième approche analyse le processus de sélection des politiques économiques dans une démocratie. Plus précisément, on ne cherche plus à rendre crédible la politique temporairement incohérente, on part de l'hypothèse qu'il existe des règles, et on se demande comment elles sont choisies.

Summary

Summary

This paper surveys recent advances in the time-consistency literature. We first show how standard credibility problems, when plunged in intergenerational games, might be solve in a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium between generations. Then we review a quite different approach according to which, time consistency problems are solved a kind of cooperative equilibrium between Governments and private agents. We close the paper with a presentation of the Cohen and Michel's definition of politically credible policies, namely rules which are the outcome of a political debate in a democracy.

Keywords

311321311321
Type
Research Article
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 59 , Issue 3 , 1993 , pp. 297 - 325
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 1993 

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Footnotes

*

Nous remercions P. Michel pour ses commentaires. Cet article a bénéficié également des commentaires de deux rapporteurs anonymes ainsi que ceux du rédacteur en chef de la revue.

References

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