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Assurance maladie et redistribution : le cas de l'arrêt maladie

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

Stéphanie Maillot-Bugnon
Stéphanie Maillot-Bugnon*
Affiliation:
CRESE, Université de Besançon
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Résumé

Cet article étudie le rôle redistributif d'une assurance sociale exclusive en présence d'un mécanisme d'imposition directe optimale. Les agents sont caractérisés par une productivité individuelle et un risque maladie. La réalisation de ce risque engendre une dépense de santé ainsi qu'une perte de revenu liée à l'arrêt maladie. L'objectif est de déterminer les conditions sous lesquelles une couverture uniforme des soins de santé et un revenu de remplacement individuel sont redistributifs. L'assurance sociale optimale peut-elle être complète ?

Summary

Summary

This article studies the role of an exclusive social insurance as a redistributive mechanism in presence of an optimal linear income tax. Agents differ in labor productivity and in loss probability. In case of illness, they suffer a health care expenditure and an income loss. The purpose is to determine the conditions under which a uniform health care coverage and an individual income based on personnal income allow income redistribution. Is a complete social insurance optimal ?

Keywords

redistributiontaxation optimaleassurance socialeH23H21H50redistributiontaxation optimaleassurance socialeH23H21H50
Type
Research Article
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 71 , Issue 4 , 2005 , pp. 427 - 443
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 2005 

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References

references

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