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Quelle place pour les incitations dans la gestion du personnel enseignant?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

Françoise Larré  and
Jean-Michel Plassard
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Résumé

A l'heure de l'économie du savoir et de la connaissance, l'éducation est devenue un enjeu majeur et l'enseignant a acquis une place centrale dans le processus de production d'éducation. Dans ces conditions, sont recherchés les moyens d'augmenter la performance des enseignants afin d'améliorer les résultats scolaires des élèves. La mise en place de structures incitatives (notamment la rémunération à la performance) est souvent suggérée mais les études démontrant l'efficacité des incitations restent mitigées.

Cet article propose une revue de la littérature théorique et empirique sur la façon dont les incitations affectent le comportement des enseignants. Les arguments pour et contre la mise en incitation des enseignants sont étu-diés. En particulier, nous examinons i) les difficultés à contrôler et à évaluer la performance des enseignants, ii) la question du travail en équipe dans un contexte d'individualisation de la performance et iii) le problème du multitâches lorsque les incitations portent sur seulement quelques tâches.

Summary

Summary

In the era of the economy of knowledge and learning, education has become a major issue and teacher has become a very important variable in the process of producing education. Incentives as performance-pay for teachers are frequently suggested as a way of improving teacher performance and educational outcomes in schools, but the empirical evidence to date on its effectiveness is mixed.

This paper offers a review of both the theoretical and empirical literature on education experiment and reforms that alter the incentives that teachers face. Arguments for and against teacher incentives are studied. In particular, we examine i) the difficulty in monitoring and evaluation teacher performance, ii) the specific issue of team production in a context of rewarding individual teacher performance and iii) the multi-tasks problem when only some of which are measured and incentivized.

Keywords

rémunération à la performanceincitationsenseignantsévaluationindividualisationmultitâchesI21I28J33J45M52performance payteacher incentivesevaluationgroup and individual incentivesmulti-tasksI21I28J33J45M52
Type
Research Article
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 74 , Issue 3 , 2008 , pp. 359 - 403
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 2008 

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