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Indemnisation des préjudices et fréquence des procès en présence d’une asymétrie d’information sur l’aversion au risque des parties

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

Éric Langlais
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Abstract:

This paper studies in a model à la Bebchuk how the existence of an asymmetric information on the risk aversion of parties engaged in a trial affects the way they litigate. We first consider the situation where the plaintiff is the informed party, and solve for the equilibrium with and without pre-trial negotiations. Then, we analyze the comparative static of the model and the effects of alternative fee-shfting rules. Finally, we discuss several extensions: the case where the defendant is the informed party, the influence of the representation of litigants’ preferences, and of the existence of the optimistic bias (or self-serving bias).

Résumé:

Résumé:

L’article examine l’effet d’une asymétrie d’information sur l’aversion au risque des parties opposées dans un litige, dans un modèle à la Bebchuk. On étudie d’abord le cas où le plaignant est la partie informée, en caractérisant l’équilibre sans et avec négociation avant le procès. On étudie ensuite la statique comparative du modèle, ainsi que l’incidence du choix d’une règle d’allocation des coûts du procès. On discute enfin plusieurs extensions: le cas où le défendeur est la partie informée, l’influence de la représentation des préférences et l’existence de biais d’optimisme comparatif ou de représentation de soi (self-serving bias).

Keywords

litigationsasymmetric informationbias in risk perceptionD81K42litigesasymétrie d’informationbiais de perception du risqueD81K42
Type
Research Article
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 74 , Issue 2 , 2008 , pp. 191 - 218
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 2008 

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Footnotes

*

CEREFIGE et Université Nancy 2.

References

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