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Exports and Wages: Discriminating between the Sources of Rents*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

Lionel Fontagné  and
Daniel Mirza
Lionel Fontagné
Affiliation:
CEPII (Paris, France), PSE (University Pans 1-CNRS)
Daniel Mirza*
Affiliation:
CREM (University of Rennes 1-CNRS), CEPII (Paris, France)
*
**email: [email protected]
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Summary

When do exports lead to rents? And when are they shared with employees? This paper proposes a double empirical test that deals with this question, based on a mix of rent sharing theories and Cournot Oligopoly. We find that most of the OECD exporting activities are associated with some rents that are shared with employees. However, we also show that the destination of sales matter, as rents seem to originate mostly from exporting to other OECD economies or, to a lesser extent, selling to own markets. Exports to developing countries' however, seem to be associated with positive rents only in a small minority of industries.

Résumé

Résumé

Et quand sont-elles partagées avec les employés ? Ce papier propose deux tests empiriques qui tentent de répondre à cette question. Ces tests sont basés sur un modèle d'Oligopole où des rentes sont susceptibles d'être partagées entre employeurs et employés. Nous trouvons que la plupart des activités d'exportations des pays de l'OCDE sont associées à des rentes partagées avec des employés. Mais la taille des rentes tirées du commerce dépend de la destination des exportations : les marchés de l'OCDE sont générateurs de forts profits dans la plupart des industries manufacturières. A l'opposé, sur les marchés des pays en développement les rentes extraites sont concentrées dans une petite poignée d'industries.

Keywords

commerce internationalrentessalairesinternational traderentswages

JEL classification

L1: Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance J3: Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs F1: Trade
Type
Research Article
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 75 , Issue 1 , March 2009 , pp. 35 - 61
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 2009 

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Footnotes

*

We are grateful to Rod Falvey, Sebastien Jean, David Margolis for very helpful comments on an earlier draft of the work.

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