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Could environmental public policy be harmful for the environment?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

Mouez Fodha
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Summary

This article analyzes the consequences of environmental public policy when private agents have access to abatement activity, financed by private contributions. The issue at stake is the interactions between private involvement in abatement activities and public intervention. The analysis of the consequences of environmental tax policy on capital and environmental quality shows that public and private abatements may or may not be substitutable, depending on abatement efficiencies and on the initial economic and environmental inefficiencies.

Résumé

Résumé

Cet article analyse les conséquences de la politique environnementale lorsque les agents ont accès à une activité privée de dépollution. Il cherche à comprendre les interactions entre l'engagement privé et l'intervention publique dans la protection de l'environnement. L'étude des conséquences de la politique fiscale sur le stock de capital et la qualité environnementale montre que, selon la nature des inefficiences économiques (sur ou sous-accumu-lation du capital) et environnementales (sur ou sous-entretien de l'environnement) et les efficacités relatives des techniques de dépollution, les actions publiques et privées doivent se renforcer mutuellement ou se substituer l'une à l'autre.

Keywords

externalités environnementalesdépollutionpolitique fiscaleQ52Q58Environmental externalitiesabatementtax policyQ52Q58
Type
Research Article
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 76 , Issue 4 , 2010 , pp. 371 - 390
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 2010 

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Footnotes

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Centre d'Économie de la Sorbonne - University Paris 1, Paris School of Economics, Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112 Bid de I'Hôpital, 75647 Paris Cedex, Tel.: +33 (0)1 44 07 82 21, Fax.: +33 (0)1 44 07 82 31, E-mail: fodha @univ-paris1 .fr

References

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