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Regles positionnelles iteratives, principe majoritaire et preferences unimodales

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 August 2002

Dominique Lepelley  and
Laurent Vidu
Dominique Lepelley
Affiliation:
CREME, Université de Caen, 14032 Caen Cedex, France.
Laurent Vidu
Affiliation:
CREME, Université de Caen, 14032 Caen Cedex, France.
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Abstract

Sequential scoring rules are multi-stage social choice tules that work as follows: at each stage of the process, a scoreis computed for each alternative by taking into account its position in the individual preference rankings, and thealternative with the lowest score is eliminated. The current paper studies the ability of these rules for choosing theCondorcet winner (or the strong Condorcet winner) when individual preferences are single-peaked.

Keywords

Choix socialrégles de votecritère de Condorcetunimodalité
Type
Research Article
Information
RAIRO - Operations Research , Volume 34 , Issue 3 , July 2000 , pp. 347 - 362
Copyright
© EDP Sciences, 2000

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