Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-lnqnp Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-26T18:55:41.785Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Unification and Scientific Realism Revisited

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 January 2023

Malcolm R. Forster
Malcolm R. Forster*
Affiliation:
Monash University
Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

Core share and HTML view are not available for this content. However, as you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button.

Section 2 will begin by formulating Reichenbach’s principle of common cause in a more general way than is usual but in a way that makes the idea behind it a lot clearer. The way that Salmon has pushed the principle into the services of scientific realism will be explained in terms of an example, van Fraassen objects, Salmon modifies his stand and van Fraassen rejoins - all in section 2. (See van Fraassen 1980, chapter 2).

In this episode I think van Fraassen right in claiming - against Salmon that there is no categorical imperative for common cause explanation, and I add my own examples in section 3. The first example ‘is the explanation of the correlation between the equilibrium positions of two objects on a balance in terms of their property of “mass” and the law of moments.

Type
Part VI. General Philosophy of Science (B)
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1986 , Issue 1: Volume One: Contributed Papers 1986 , 1986 , pp. 394 - 405
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1986

Footnotes

1

Sincere thanks go to Professor Peter Finch and especially to Professor Cliff Hooker for useful feedback on the paper. As always, the final responsibility for errors and oversights are mine.

References

Earman, J. (1978). “Fairy Tales vs. an Ongoing Story: Ramsey’s Neglected Argument for Scientific Realism.” Philosophical Studies 33: 195–202.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Friedman, M. (1981). “Theoretical Explanation.” In Time Reduction and Reality. Edited by R.A. Healey. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pages 1-16.Google Scholar
Reichenbach, H. (1956). The Direction of Time. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Salmon, W. (1978). “Why Ask ‘Why?’? An Inquiry Concerning Scientific Explanation.” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 51: 683–705.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Smart, J.J.C (1963). Philosophy and Scientific Realism. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.Google Scholar
Smart, J.J.C (1985). “Laws of Nature and Cosmic Coincidences.” The Philosophical Quarterly 35: 272–280.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Spiegel, M.R (1963). Theory and Problems of Statistics. (Schaum’s Outline Series). New York: Schaum Publishing Co.Google Scholar
van Fraassen, B.C (1980). The Scientific Image. Oxford: Clarendon Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
van Fraassen, B.C (1982). “The Charybdis of Realism: Epistemological Implications of Bell’s Inequality.” Synthese 52: 25–38.CrossRefGoogle Scholar