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Towards a Richer Model of Man: A Critique of Laudan’s Progress and Its Problems

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 January 2023

Robert S. Westman
Robert S. Westman*
Affiliation:
University of California at Los Angeles
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In setting forth a new theory of the growth of scientific knowledge, Larry Laudan shows that any account of scientific change has consequences for the relationship between the history, philosophy and sociology of science. It is a laudable feature of his work that he does not treat any of these disciplines as undifferentiated monoliths. In fact, one of his main goals is to show that his account of progress requires specific ways of doing and relating these three disciplines. As an historian invited to speak at the Philosophy of Science Association, it seemed appropriate for me to appraise the function of history of science in Laudan’s program. Without going into unnecessary detail, let me begin by examining some of his main claims.

The focus of Laudan’s argument is on science construed as a form of problem-solving activity and on progress and rationality as appraisals of problem-solving capabilities.

Type
Part XII. Laudan’s Progress and Its Problems
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1978 , Issue 2: Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers 1978 , 1978 , pp. 492 - 504
Copyright
Copyright © 1981 Philosophy of Science Association

References

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