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Theory-Ladenness and Theory Comparison

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

William B. Jones
William B. Jones*
Affiliation:
Old Dominion University
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Extract

Both the most controversial and the most widely publicized aspect of the “new empiricism” of Feyerabend Hanson Kuhn and Toulmin is the thesis (rightly or wrongly) attributed to them that irrationality and subjectivity play a central role in science. The idea that science is pervaded by apt parallels to religious conversion and political propagadizing has achieved truly surprising currency. The epistemological root of this view is the belief that the theory-laden conception of observation which these philosophers espouse effectively prevents any rational comparison of the observational support commanded by competing theories. It has even been pointed out that in the absence of a neutral observational language in terms of which to identify and describe the objects or processes with which rival theories are (supposedly) concerned, there can be no real basis for calling them “rivals”.

It is the intent of this paper to set forth conditions which, if met, would provide a rational basis for believing, even in a context in which observation is theory-laden, that two theories are rivals and that one of them enjoys observational support that is superior to that enjoyed by the other.

Type
Part III. Observation and Theory
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1978 , Issue 1: Volume One: Contributed Papers 1978 , 1978 , pp. 83 - 92
Copyright
Copyright © 1978 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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