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Testing for Convergent Realism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 January 2023

Jerrold L. Aronson
Jerrold L. Aronson*
Affiliation:
State University of New York-Binghamton
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Extract

In “A Confutation of Convergent Realism,” Larry Laudan presents the realist with these fascinating challenges:

What,then,of realism itself as a ‘scientific’ hypothesis?…If realism has made some novel predictions or been subjected to carefully controlled tests, one does not learn about it from the literature of contemporary realism. (1981, p. 46.)

He then goes on to say:

No proponent of realism has sought to show that realism satisfies those stringent empirical demands which the realist himself minimally insists on when appraising scientific theories. (1981, p. 46)

Not only do I fully endorse what Laudan says in these passages, I think it is time to take him up on these challenges.

Laudan’s position has been that scientific progress can be explained without having to appeal to verisimilitude. Instead, we explain the success of a scientific theory in terms of its subjugation to the cannons of experimental controls: those theories that have been put through proper testing during the course of their formulation are the ones that are most likely to be reliable. (1984, pp. 96-101)

Type
Part VI. Realism
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1988 , Issue 1: Volume One: Contributed Papers 1988 , 1988 , pp. 188 - 193
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1988

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Footnotes

1

This paper is an expansion of a discussion note which is forthcoming in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.

References

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