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Sellars on Scientific Realism and Perceiving

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

James W. Cornman
James W. Cornman*
Affiliation:
University of Pennsylvania
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Extract

In his paper prepared for the 1976 meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Professor Sellars has raised two quite different objections, one against Professor van Fraassen and one against me. Although it may be that I should limit my reply to the issue concerning my theory of perceiving that Sellars raised, I cannot resist injecting myself into the debate between Sellars and van Fraassen. One reason I want to engage in their battle is that I find reasons for disagreeing with both of them on certain important issues which they have debated. My hope is that by joining their discussion I will help clarify the issues involved. After that, however, I will reply to Sellars’ objection to my theory of perceptual experience and perceiving.

Sellars and van Fraassen are diametrically opposed on the issue of scientific realism versus scientific instrumentalism.

Type
Part VI. Is Scientific Realism Tenable?
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1976 , Issue 2: Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers 1976 , 1976 , pp. 344 - 358
Copyright
Copyright © 1977 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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References

[1] Cornman, J. Materialism and Sensations. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971.Google Scholar
[2] Cornman, J. “Materialism and Some Myths about Some Givens.” The Monist 56(1972): 215–233.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[3] Cornman, J. Perception, Common Sense, and Science. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975.Google Scholar
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