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Saving the Differences: Gadamer and Rorty

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

Charles B. Guignon
Charles B. Guignon*
Affiliation:
The University of Texas at Austin
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Extract

Professor Bernstein has shown how, coming from three distinct orientations in twentieth century philosophy, Gadamer, Habermas and Rorty have arrived at strikingly similar conclusions. The upshot of their thought, as Professor Bernstein points out, is a powerful critique of traditional foundationalism. There is no uninterpreted “given”, no theory-neutral set of “facts”, no timeless structure of reason, no disinterested vantage point for research, outside of the interpretations and interests of the community of interpreters that are embodied in our current social practices. The collapse of the bad old dream of firm foundations and of ultimate convergence on the truth is taken as a fait accompli by Bernstein. The question that confronts us now is what to make of this situation. On the face of it there appear to be two types of stance open to us.

Type
Part VII. Recent American and Continental Developments
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1982 , Issue 2: Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers 1982 , 1982 , pp. 360 - 367
Copyright
Copyright © 1983 Philosophy of Science Association

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References

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