Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-q99xh Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-26T17:14:36.708Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Risk Assessment and Uncertainty

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

Kristin Shrader-Frechette
Kristin Shrader-Frechette*
Affiliation:
University of South Florida
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

Risk assessments done by the Ford Foundation-Mitre Corporation and the Union of Concerned Scientists agree on the hazard probabilities and consequences associated with commercial nuclear fission, but make opposed recommendations regarding using atomic energy to generate electricity. The UCS risk analysis decided against use of the technology; the Ford-Mitre study advised in favor of it (Union of Concerned Scientists 1977; Nuclear Energy Policy Study Group 1977; Cooke 1982, p. 334).

The two studies agreed on the data but made different policy recommendations because they followed different methodological rules at the third, risk-evaluation, stage of assessment. (The first two stages are risk identification and risk estimation.) The Ford-Mitre research was based on the widely accepted Bayesian decision criterion that it is rational to choose the action with the best expected value or utility, where ‘expected value’ or ‘expected utility’ is defined as the weighted sum of all possible consequences of the action, and where the weights are given by the probability associated with each consequence.

Type
Part XV. Risk Assessment
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1988 , Issue 2: Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers 1988 , 1988 , pp. 504 - 517
Copyright
Copyright © 1989 by the Philosophy of Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Arrow, K. (1951), “Alternative Approaches to the Theory of Choice in Risk-Taking Situations”, Econometrica 19: 404–437.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Arrow, K. (1983), “Some Ordinalist-Utilitarian Notes on Rawls’ Theory of Justice”, The Journal of Philosophy 70:245–263.Google Scholar
Cohen, B. and Lee, I. (1979), “A Catalog of Risks”, Health Physics 36: 707–722.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Comar, C. (1979), “Risk: A Pragmatic De Minimus Approach”, Science 203: 319.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cooke, R. (1982), “Risk Assessment and Rational Decision”, Dialectica 36: 220–351.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cooke, R. (1988), Experts in Uncertainty, unpublished manuscript.Google Scholar
Coombs, C. and Beardslee, D. (1954), “On Decision-Making Under Uncertainty”, in Decision Processes, Thrall, R., Coombs, C. and Davis, R. (eds.). London: John Wiley, pp. 255–286.Google Scholar
Davis, R. (1954), “Introduction”, in Decision Processes, Thrall, R., Coombs, C. and Davis, R. (eds.). London: John Wiley, pp. 1–18.Google Scholar
Diamond, P. (1967), “Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility”, Journal of Political Economy 75: 765–766.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Eells, E. (1982), Rational Decision and Causality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ellsworth, L. (1978), “Decision-Theoretic Analysis of Rawls’ Original Position”, in Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory, Hooker, C., Leach, J. and McClennen, E. (eds.). Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 29–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Giere, R. (1979), Understanding Scientific Reasoning. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.Google Scholar
Graham, J. (1982), “Some Explanations for Disparities in Lifesaving Investments”, Policy Studies Review 1: 692–704.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Harsanyi, J. (1975), “Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality? A Critique of John Rawls's Theory”, American Political Science Review 59: 594–606.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Harsanyi, J. (1976), Essays on Ethics, Social Behavior, and Scientific Explanation. Dordrecht: Reidel.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Harsanyi, J. (1977a), “Understanding Rational Behavior”, in Foundational Problems in the Special Sciences, Butts, R. and Hintikka, J. (eds.). Boston: Reidel, pp. 315–344.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Harsanyi, J. (1977b), Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Harsanyi, J. (1977c), “On the Rationale of the Bayesian Approach”, in Foundational Problems in the Special Sciences, Butts, R. and Hintikka, J. (eds.). Boston: Reidel, pp. 381–392.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Harsanyi, J. (1986), “Advances in Understanding Rational Behavior”, in Rational Choice, Elster, J. (ed.). New York: New York University Press, pp. 88–107.Google Scholar
Hushon, J. (1979), “Plenary Session Report”, in Symposium/Workshop on Nuclear and Nonnuclear Energy Systems: Risk Assessment and Governmental Decision Making. Mclean, Virginia: Mitre Corporation, pp. 742–760.Google Scholar
Jeffrey, R. (1983), The Logic of Decision. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A. (1981a), “Subjective Probability”, in Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, Kahneman, D., Tversky, A. and Slovic, P. (eds.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 32–47.Google Scholar
Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A. (1981b), “On the Psychology of Prediction”, in Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, Kahneman, D., Tversky, A. and Slovic, P. (eds.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 48–68.Google Scholar
Luce, R. and Raiffa, H. (1958), Games and Decisions. New York: John Wiley.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Levi, I. (1978), “Newcomb's Many Problems”, in Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory, vol. 1, Hooker, C., Leach, J. and McClennen, E. (eds.). Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 369–384.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
March, J. (1986), “Bounded Rationality”, in Rational Choice, Elster, J. (ed.). New York: New York University Press, pp. 142–170.Google Scholar
Marschak, J. (1954), “Towards an Economic Theory of Organization and Information”, in Decision Processes, Thrall, R., Coombs, C. and Davis, R. (eds.). London: John Wiley, pp. 187–220.Google Scholar
Maxey, M. (1979), “Managing Low-Level Radioactive Wastes”, in Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management, Watson, J. (ed.). Williamsburg, Virginia: Health Physics Society, pp. 400–419.Google Scholar
McClennen, E. (1978), “The Minimax Theory and Expected Utility Reasoning”, in Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory, Hooker, C., Leach, J. and McClennen, E. (eds.). Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 337–368.Google Scholar
Milnor, J. (1954), “Games Against Nature”, in Decision Processes, Thrall, R., Coombs, C. and Davis, R. (eds.). London: John Wiley, pp. 49–59.Google Scholar
Mulvihill, R. (1965), Analysis of United States Power Reactor Accident Probability, PRC R-695. Los Angeles: Planning Research Corporation.Google Scholar
Nagel, E. (1939), “Principles of the Theory of Probability”, in International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, vol. 1. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 49–60.Google Scholar
Nuclear Energy Policy Study Group (1977), Nuclear Power: Issues and Choices. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger.Google Scholar
Okrent, D. (1980), “Comment on Societal Risk”, Science 208: 372–375.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Otway, H. and Peltu, M. (1985), Regulating Industrial Risks. London: Butterworths.Google Scholar
Raloff, J. and Silberner, J. (1986), “Chernobyl: Emerging Data on Accident”, Science News 129: 292–293.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rawls, J. (1971), A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Resnick, M. (1987), Choices. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.Google Scholar
Rosenkrantz, R. (1981), Foundations and Applications of Inductive Probability. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview.Google Scholar
Savage, L. (1954), The Foundations of Statistics. New York: John Wiley.Google Scholar
Sen, A. (1977), “Welfare Inequalities and Rawlsian Axiomatics”, in Foundational Problems in the Special Sciences, Butts, R., Hintikka, J. (eds.). Boston: Reidel, pp. 271–292.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shrader-Frechette, K. (1983), Nuclear Power and Public Policy. Boston: Reidel.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Slovic, P., Fischoff, B., and Lichtenstein, S. (1981), “Facts vs. Fears”, in Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, Kahneman, D., Tversky, A. and Slovic, P. (eds.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 463–489.Google Scholar
Smith, V. (1986), “Benefit Analysis for Natural Hazards”, Risk Analysis 6: 321–329.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Starr, C. and Whipple, C. (1980), “Risks of Risk Decisions”, Science 208: 1114–1118.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1986), “The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice”, in Rational Choice, Elster, J. (ed.). New York: New York University Press, pp. 123–141.Google Scholar
Union of Concerned Scientists (1977), The Risks of Nuclear Power Reactors, a Review of the NRC Reactor Safety Study WASH 1400. Cambridge, Massachusetts: University of Concerned Scientists.Google Scholar
Vail, S. (1954), “Alternative Calculi of Subjective Probabilities”, in Decision Processes, Thrall, R., Coombs, C. and Davis, R. (eds.). London: John Wiley, pp. 87–89.Google Scholar
Watkins, J. (1977), “Towards a Unified Decision Theory: A Non-Bayesian Approach”, in Foundational Problems in the Special Sciences, Butts, R., Hintikka, J. (eds.). Boston: Reidel, pp. 345–380.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wildavsky, A. and Douglas, M. (1982), Risk and Culture. Berkeley: University of California Press.Google Scholar