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Reduction and Realism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 January 2023

Margaret Morrison
Margaret Morrison*
Affiliation:
Stanford University
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In his recent book Foundations of Space-Time Theories Michael Friedman argues for a realism about theoretical structure based on specific methodological practices concerning theory unification. Theoretical structures that are essential to the unifying process are to be given a literal realistic interpretation while the remaining ones can be considered as having merely representational status. Friedman’s account of unification involves the notion of a literal reduction or identification of observational properties of entities or objects with their theoretical counterparts. The relationship between these two levels of theory can be construed as that of submodel to model. Once the appropriate reductions are achieved we are then free to conjoin certain theoretical structures with others thereby enabling us, over time, to produce a unified theory encompassing a variety of domains.

The alternative to this view Friedman describes as the representationalist approach. Instead of characterizing the relationship between observational and theoretical structures as that of submodel to model the observational properties are simply correlated by way of an embedding (as opposed to an identity) map with their appropriate theoretical counterparts.

Type
Part IX. Interpreting Scientific Inference
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1988 , Issue 1: Volume One: Contributed Papers 1988 , 1988 , pp. 286 - 293
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1988

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