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Realism, Miracles, and the Common Cause

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

James Robert Brown
James Robert Brown*
Affiliation:
University of Toronto
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Extract

Scientific realism is the doctrine that our theories are intended to literal descriptions of the world. It is the claim that there is a realm of non-observable entities and processes, and that science legitimately appeals to this realm in its explanations of the observable world. This is a sketchy characterization, and with it go some sketchy arguments. These are the miracle arguments for scientific realism. Here is the way J.J.C. Smart puts his version:

If the phenomenalist about theoretical entities is correct we must believe in a cosmic coincidence. That is, if this is so, statements about electrons, etc., are of only instrumental value: they simply enable us to predict phenomena on the level of galvanometers and cloud chambers. They do nothing to remove the surprising character of these phenomena....[But is] it not odd that the phenomena of the world should be such as to make a purely instrumental theory true?

Type
Part III. Scientific Realism and Observation
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1982 , Issue 1: Volume One: Contributed Papers 1982 , 1982 , pp. 98 - 106
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1982

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Footnotes

1

For helpful comments I am indebted to Kathleen Okruhlik.

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