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Probabilistic Explanations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

James H. Fetzer
James H. Fetzer*
Affiliation:
New College of the University of South Florida
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Extract

Hanna (l981) and Humphreys (1981) have offered criticisms which tend to undermine the plausibility of the single-case propensity account of probabilistic explanation advanced in Fetzer (1974) and (1981a). Hanna contends that, on single-case criteria, there typically are no unique single-case propensity values to assign to the occurrence of particular explanandum-events because the propensities for these outcomes to occur are continuously evolving over time (yielding “the temporal relativity of probabilistic explanations”), while Humphreys suggests that, whether or not unique single-case probability values happen to be available at all, they are nevertheless incidental and dispensable elements of otherwise potentially acceptable explanatory accounts. Indeed, Humphreys and Railton (1978) and (l981) appear to converge in common agreement on the inessential function of single-case probability assignments within the context of probabilistic explanations.

Type
Part IV. Probabilistic Explanation
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1982 , Issue 2: Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers 1982 , 1982 , pp. 194 - 207
Copyright
Copyright © 1983 Philosophy of Science Association

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References

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