Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 February 2022
Perhaps no claim in the philosophy of logic has attracted as much attention in the last decade as one defended by Hilary Putnam: some of the so-called ‘necessary truths’ of logic may turn out to be false for empirical reasons and consequently “logic is, in a certain sense, a natural science.” (p. 216). Putnam and others have attempted to reinforce this position by citing findings from quantum mechanics, findings which are intended to provide empirical reasons leading to the conclusion that particular aspects of classical logic have in fact turned out to be false. In this paper I will challenge one of the major procedures leading to the conclusion that quantum mechanics provides ample reason to revise logic. Quantum mechanics, I will argue, has shown neither that logic is empirical nor that some aspect of classical logic is false.
I gratefully acknowledge encouragement and helpful comments from Roger T. Simonds and Bas C. van Fraassen and financial support from the Borden P. Bowne Foundation.