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On Values in Science: Is the Epistemic/Non-Epistemic Distinction Useful?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

Phyllis Rooney
Phyllis Rooney*
Affiliation:
Oakland University
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Extract

The debate about values in science in the last decade or so reflects an important shift in what many acknowledge as the “post-positivist” era in philosophy of science. It reflects the erosion of the fact-value distinction in at least one of its more simplistic forms (facts belong in science, values outside), and it marks the path to a more enhanced understanding of the roles of both facts and values in scientific inquiry. This discussion has, above all, contributed to what we might call a revaluation of value: from the point of view of the epistemologist or philosopher of science values are neither uniform nor uniformly “bad”.

Type
Part I. Methodology and Explanation
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1992 , Issue 1: Volume One: Contributed Papers 1992 , 1992 , pp. 13 - 22
Copyright
Copyright © 1992 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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