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Levels of Reflexivity: Unnoted Differences within the “Strong Programme” in the Sociology of Knowledge

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

Edward Manier
Edward Manier*
Affiliation:
University of Notre Dame
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Extract

Although Barry Barnes (1974, 1977) and David Bloor (1976, 1978, 1981) are co-workers in the Science Studies Unit at the University of Edinburgh, there are hitherto unnoted but fundamental differences in their programs in the sociology of science.

Bloor defines his “strong programme” in the sociology of science by three basic tenets (“causality,” “symmetry,” and “reflexivity”) and also claims to establish laws and to test a general theory of the causal links connecting cognitive and social factors in the history of science. (Bloor 1976, pp. 4-5). In other words, the “strong programme” aims to be: (1) Causal, i.e., concerned with the conditions which bring about beliefs or states of knowledge. (2) Symmetrical, i.e., appealing to the same sorts of causes and to the same patterns of causal explanation for all beliefs and cognitive claims, whether regarded as true or false, rational or irrational, successful or unsuccessful. (3) Reflexive, i.e., using the explanatory resources of the sociology of science in the critical evaluation and explanation of the sociology of science itself.

Type
Part VII. Evolutionary Epistemology and the Sociology of Knowledge
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1980 , Issue 1: Volume One: Contributed Papers 1980 , 1980 , pp. 197 - 207
Copyright
Copyright © 1980 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

1

I am very appreciative of David Bloor's friendly and generous responses to early versions of my criticism of his program. The development of my evaluation of Douglas’ use of the scheme of “classification and control” owes much to collegial discussion with J. David Lewis, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Notre Dame. The efforts of Bloor and Lewis isolate responsibility for errors remaining in the paper squarely on my shoulders. My work on this topic was initially facilitated by a conference grant from the Center for the Study of Man in Contemporary Society, University of Notre Dame; it was continued while I was on leave as a Fellow of the National Humanities Institute at the University of Chicago.

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