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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 February 2022
For many of us nurtured in idealist ways inclining us to unwavering acceptance of Kantian principles, 1951 was a bad year. We read in Reichenbach's The Rise of Saientifio Philosophy of the “disintegration of the synthetic a priori”. Kant had taught us that there are very general principles—each one connected to a primal category of thought—that are necessary in the formation of mathematics and physics and are expressible in nonanalytic propositions. However, since Kant's death in 1804 both mathematics and physics have developed revolutionary traits: non-euclidian geometries, new developments in symbolic logic, relativity physics, and finally, quantum mechanics, sealed the negative fate of Kant's high principles. Henceforth we must accept that there are no non-empty claims about reality that can be counted as necessary or indispensable to mathematics and science.