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Individuality and Macroevolutionary Theory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 January 2023

Marc Ereshefsky
Marc Ereshefsky*
Affiliation:
University of Wisconsin
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The issue of whether species are individuals is now an old one; the literature abounds with arguments, counter-arguments and counter-counter-arguments for their individuality. The question I want to take up in this paper is not whether species are indeed individuals, but what ramifications their alleged individuality has for macroevolutionary theory.

According to those biologists who argue for a new theory of macroevolution, the individuality of species is one of the fundamental premises of that theory. For example, Joel Cracraft writes of himself and others that

The issue of individuality… is at the heart of arguments of those evolutionary biologists who see a need to view the patterns and processes of evolution as being hierarchically arranged into microevolutionary and macroevolutionary levels (1987, p. 332).

Type
Part VII. Biology
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1988 , Issue 1: Volume One: Contributed Papers 1988 , 1988 , pp. 216 - 222
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1988

Footnotes

1

I want to thank Elliott Sober for his constant help and encouragement, and David Hull for his comments on an earlier version of this paper.

References

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